Kelly James Clark and Michael Rae, eds., REASON, METAPHYSICS, AND MIND: ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ALVIN PLANTINGA by Segal, Aaron
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 32 Issue 1 Article 6 
1-1-2015 
Clark & Rea, eds., REASON, METAPHYSICS, AND MIND: ESSAYS 
ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ALVIN PLANTINGA 
Aaron Segal 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Segal, Aaron (2015) "Clark & Rea, eds., REASON, METAPHYSICS, AND MIND: ESSAYS ON THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF ALVIN PLANTINGA," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers: Vol. 32 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol32/iss1/6 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS
Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, 
edited by Kelly James Clark and Michael Rea. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 220 pages. $85.00 (hardcover)
AARON SEGAL, Yeshiva College, Yeshiva University.
In May 2010, hundreds of Alvin Plantinga’s colleagues, students, and ad-
mirers gathered at the University of Notre Dame for a conference celebrat-
ing his career and retirement. The conference made abundantly clear a 
fact of which readers of this journal are no doubt aware: Plantinga’s con-
tributions to philosophy over the past half-century have been seminal and 
wide-ranging. Nearly all the talks descended from an original contribution 
that Plantinga made at some point in his career (naturally, each talk had 
other ancestors as well); and the topics ranged from pure metaphysics, 
epistemology, and philosophy of mind, to alloys of those philosophical 
areas (and still others) and religion. This made for a variegated and rich 
conference. Naturally enough, the richness of the conference is reflected in 
its proceedings, recently published under the title Reason, Metaphysics, and 
Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga. My remarks on each 
contribution will, perforce, be much briefer than I’d like.
Certain themes or issues that have been close to Plantinga’s heart 
(and mind) made multiple appearances at the conference, and so lend 
a natural structure to the volume. Two of the papers, Thomas P. Flint’s 
and Dean Zimmerman’s, are concerned with complete divine foreknowl-
edge: the former with whether such foreknowledge is consistent with free 
creaturely action and the latter with (1) whether such foreknowledge is 
consistent with God’s rational deliberation and choice and (2) whether 
such foreknowledge could, all by itself, offer God any “providential ad-
vantage.” Flint, in “The Varieties of Accidental Necessity,” addresses a 
schematic version of the usual argument for theological incompatibilism 
(that is, for the claim that divine foreknowledge of free creaturely action is 
impossible), one which makes use of the notion of accidental necessity, of 
something’s being in some sense fixed or settled-and-done. Flint emphasizes 
that the argument schema he is considering is schematic, in part, because 
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the term “accidentally necessary” doesn’t pick out a single notion. Flint 
catalogues several different notions of accidental necessity in his charac-
teristically careful and thorough way; he highlights those that have been 
employed frequently in the literature, as well as one that he thinks has 
not been given its due. Flint’s main point is cautionary: once we notice 
these various notions and the variety of arguments to which they corre-
spond, we should be careful not to attribute to the Molinist (or anyone, for 
that matter) a reply to all the varieties solely because she gives that reply 
to one of the varieties. The Molinist can reasonably take the arguments 
case-by-case.
Zimmerman, in “The Providential Usefulness of ‘Simple Foreknowl-
edge,’” sides with David Hunt, who has argued that there is no impos-
sibility in deliberating about whether to make p true, and rationally 
choosing to make p true, when one already knows that p will be true. One 
can so deliberate as long as one “brackets” one’s knowledge of p. And one 
can so rationally choose, Zimmerman argues, in at least two ways: either 
one can choose based on some reason other than one’s knowledge that p 
will be true (effectively “bracketing” one’s knowledge of p), or one can 
choose based on one’s knowledge of p together with a desire not to “rock 
the boat” or “change the future.” As Zimmerman notes, only the former 
seems to befit God. So an advocate of complete divine foreknowledge can 
consistently maintain the rationality of God’s choices, but only if she as-
sumes that God “brackets” some of what he knows when making deci-
sions—in particular, when deciding to make p true, he must bracket his 
knowledge that p is true.
Similarly, Zimmerman argues that there is no impossibility in making 
a decision based on a belief which depends on a future event that in turn 
depends on the original decision: such explanatory loops are peculiar, but 
not impossible. Nonetheless, Zimmerman contends, such loops don’t befit 
God. As Zimmerman claims, “it is impious to suppose God is unable to 
explain why he makes momentous choices” (181). (Donald Smith, whose 
commentary on Zimmerman’s paper appears in the volume, disagrees; so 
does David Hunt. They contend that there is no objectionable explanatory 
circle here, and so nothing that isn’t fitting for God.) So an advocate of 
complete divine foreknowledge can consistently maintain the explicabil-
ity of God’s choices, but only if she assumes that God “brackets” some of 
what he knows when making decisions—in particular, when deciding to 
make p true, he must bracket his knowledge of any propositions whose 
truth depends on that of p. All this raises questions: how are we to under-
stand this “bracketing” when it comes to God? Given Zimmerman’s stric-
tures on explanatory loops, what foreknowledge, if any, can God make 
use of in his decisions? Importantly, can such foreknowledge provide God 
with any practical reason and/or any way to avoid risk that would be un-
available without that foreknowledge?
To address these questions, Zimmerman introduces and defines the 
notion of a “stage” in God’s knowledge. This notion provides a rigorous 
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account of God’s “bracketing” certain knowledge and allows us to see 
more easily what it takes for a series of divine decisions, some of which 
are based at least in part on God’s knowledge of consequences of others, 
to be rational and explicable. Zimmerman then helpfully characterizes 
the difference between theological determinism, Molinism (the thesis that 
God has comprehensive middle knowledge), and Simple Foreknowledge 
(the conjunction of the thesis that God has complete foreknowledge with 
the thesis that God has no middle knowledge) in terms of what stages 
there are in God’s knowledge. And the question of whether complete fore-
knowledge offers any providential advantages over its absence can now 
be put this way: won’t the stages in God’s knowledge be just the same 
whether He has such foreknowledge or not (such foreknowledge matter-
ing only for whether the ordering of stages is solely explanatory or tem-
poral as well)?
No, not obviously, as Zimmerman notes. The stages are likely different 
as well. If God lacks foreknowledge, then when God is deciding which 
state of affairs to actualize at t, he will not have available any knowledge 
of free creaturely activity at t or later. But if God has foreknowledge, then 
when God is deciding which state of affairs to actualize at t, he can utilize 
his knowledge of free creaturely activity at t or later as long as that activity 
does not depend on God’s decision about which state of affairs to actualize. So if, 
say, God wants to test Adam and Eve simultaneously, but does not want 
to risk them both freely failing the test, there’s nothing he can do to satisfy 
both those wants if he lacks foreknowledge. Armed with foreknowledge, 
on the other hand, God can “test the waters” by deciding to test Adam at 
t, and then rely on his foreknowledge that Adam won’t fail the test (sup-
posing he won’t) to decide that He will test Eve at t. This does not involve 
God’s decision in an explanatory circle since Adam’s passing the test does 
not depend on God’s decision to test Eve.
Zimmerman, however, concludes his essay with the fascinating sug-
gestion that those deniers of God’s foreknowledge of free creaturely ac-
tion who are A-theorists (in the philosophy of time) can recover some of 
the advantages of simple foreknowledge in some cases (in Minkowski 
space-time): God can decide which foliation of Minkowski space-time is 
a partition into sets of truly simultaneous events. Thus, God can so ar-
range things that Adam’s and Eve’s tests are simultaneous relative to 
some inertial reference frame, but such that Adam’s test truly precedes 
Eve’s test. This would allow God to utilize His knowledge of the result of 
Adam’s test in deciding whether to test Eve. As Zimmerman intimates, 
this will work only for those cases (like Adam’s and Eve’s tests) in which 
the pair of events do not affect each other because no causal process is fast 
enough to connect them; if, on the other hand, one is in or on the forward 
light-cone of the other, and they simply happen not to be causally related, 
then the adherents of Simple Foreknowledge have an advantage than 
can’t be mimicked by its deniers, at least if a “genuine foliation” never 
contains a pair of co-present events, one of which is located on or in the 
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forward light-cone of the other. I would add that even in the cases for 
which Zimmerman’s solution is designed, it’s not obviously successful: 
what if God wants Adam’s and Eve’s tests to be genuinely simultaneous 
but nevertheless to avoid the risk of mutual non-compliance? (Why? God 
only knows.) Then no amount of gerrymandering will help a God who 
lacks foreknowledge.
Three of the volume’s essays deal with epistemological issues: Rich-
ard Otte’s “Theory Comparison in Science and Religion,” Ernest Sosa’s 
“Descartes and Virtue Epistemology,” and Michael Bergmann’s “Com-
monsense Skeptical Theism.” Here the connections with Plantinga’s philo-
sophical work are drawn even more explicitly. Richard Otte objects to a 
pair of methodological assumptions which Otte alleges are quite often as-
sumed in the epistemology of religion literature. Moreover, echoing some 
of Plantinga’s own arguments, Otte argues that not only are the two as-
sumptions false, but the fact that they are assumed in the religious context 
reflects a double-standard, since no one would reasonably assume them 
in the scientific context. The first assumption, which he calls the “Core 
Assumption,” is that when assessing “the bearing of evidence upon re-
ligious belief, we should look at the bearing of evidence upon a certain 
core of religious belief, instead of the religious beliefs as a whole” (86). 
For example, when assessing the evidential bearing of evil on Jewish (or 
Christian or Muslim) belief, we ought to look at the evidential bearing of 
evil on so-called Austere Theism. The second assumption, which he calls 
the “Probabilistic Assumption,” is that “the probabilities we should use in 
philosophy of religion are not personal probabilities, but some sort of ob-
jective probabilities, conditional upon some agreed upon public evidence. 
Furthermore, rational belief is closely connected to these probabilities, 
and these probabilities are accessible by reason alone” (90).
Otte, together with his commentator, Bas van Fraassen, subjects the 
Probabilistic Assumption to penetrating and multifarious criticism. And it 
is no surprise that one can attack the Probabilistic Assumption from differ-
ent vantage points, since it is something of a hodgepodge of controversial 
ontological, epistemological, and normative theses about probability. In 
worse shape still is the Core Assumption, which seems to encapsulate ob-
viously unsound methodology. Why when trying to assess the bearing of 
evidence on a certain hypothesis should one always look at the bearing of 
the evidence on some specific implication of that hypothesis rather than 
the hypothesis itself? Indeed, as Otte notes, it is simply false that if some 
evidence disconfirms (lowers the probability of) a hypothesis H*, then it 
disconfirms any hypothesis H that implies H*: it might well confirm (raise 
the probability of) H. So, even if evil disconfirms Austere Theism, that 
doesn’t in any way imply that it disconfirms Judaism (or Christianity or 
Islam); it might well confirm it.
That seems right. But I am not sure how often the Core Assumption, 
in its full generality, is in fact assumed in philosophy of religion. (I am 
also unsure how often the Probabilistic Assumption is in fact assumed 
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in philosophy of religion, but I set that aside.) When critics of particular 
religions shift their target to Austere Theism, they seem to be making the 
following very straightforward assumption: if a theory T has as a core, 
and so obviously implies, theory T*, then T can be no more probable on 
one’s total evidence than T*. So when those critics attempt to mount an 
evidential argument from evil which shows merely that Austere Theism 
is improbable on a given religious believer’s total evidence, and then they 
go on to infer something about the probability of some specific variety 
of theism, there is nothing illegitimate going on. If their argument is in 
fact successful, it will also show that each of the more specific varieties 
of theism is improbable on that religious believer’s total evidence. Otte’s 
singular focus on confirmation and disconfirmation of Austere Theism and 
its more specific varieties has obscured the question of how probable 
Austere Theism and its more specific varieties are given a certain body 
of evidence. Granted, in order to know how probable Austere Theism is 
given a certain body of evidence, we almost surely need to know the prior 
probability of Austere Theism, and Otte seems skeptical about our ability 
to know that. But Otte can’t reasonably fault a philosopher who, taking 
herself to have a good idea of what that prior probability is—or even, in 
line with Otte’s preference for personal or subjective probabilities, sim-
ply to have a prior probability assigned to Austere Theism—and hence 
what the conditional probability of Austere Theism on her total evidence 
is, then assumes that the conditional probability of Austere Theism on her total 
evidence is an upper bound for the conditional probability of each of its more 
specific varieties on her total evidence. There is nothing methodologically un-
sound about that further assumption. Otte simply goes too far when he 
concludes, “The core of a theory is basically irrelevant to the rationality of 
believing the theory” (90).
Ernest Sosa makes the case that Descartes’s epistemology is a close fore-
runner of Sosa’s own well-known variety of virtue epistemology. He ar-
gues that “Cartesian certainty” is not a matter of how confidently a belief 
is held, or even that confidence in conjunction with how well-evidenced 
the belief is. It is, rather, “superlative aptness: it is a belief’s getting it right 
through perfect competence that leaves no room for error” (115). Much of the 
essay will be familiar territory for those who have read Sosa’s epistemo-
logical work before, but Sosa’s commentator, Raymond VanArragon, adds 
an original and fitting discussion of the relationship between Plantinga’s 
notion of warrant and Sosa’s notion of reflective knowledge. In particular, 
he queries whether Christian belief, on Plantinga’s view, might also con-
stitute reflective knowledge.
Michael Bergmann’s essay is a masterful defense of the view that has 
come to be known as skeptical theism: roughly, that we have no good rea-
son for thinking that the possible goods we know of, the possible evils we 
know of, and the entailment relations we know of between possible goods 
and possible evils are representative, respectively, of the possible goods, 
possible evils, and entailment relations that there are. This skepticism is 
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the backbone of a now-popular reply to a certain sort of evidential argu-
ment from evil, viz. an argument that infers the improbability of God’s 
having a good reason to permit the evils there are from the fact that we 
can’t see any such reason.
In particular, Bergmann’s essay is a defense of the claim that skeptical 
theism does not lead to too much skepticism, a charge that, in one form 
or another, its opponents have persistently raised. Bergmann sets out to 
refute this charge by showing that the skeptical component of skeptical 
theism is consistent with a robust commitment to the deliverances of 
common sense, captured by what Bergmann calls “commonsensism”: the 
view that “(a) it is clear that we know many of the most obvious things 
we take ourselves to know (this includes the truth of simple perceptual, 
memory, introspective, mathematical, logical, and moral beliefs) and that 
(b) we also know (if we consider the question) that we are not in some 
skeptical scenario in which we are radically deceived in those beliefs” (10). 
I have no quarrel with Bergmann’s defense of skeptical theism. Indeed, 
anyone who now wishes to object to skeptical theism on the grounds that 
it leads to too much skepticism must first contend, it seems to me, with 
Bergmann’s formidable defense.
But while the bulk of Bergmann’s essay is defensive in nature, the 
essay contains a section in which Bergmann goes on the offensive. Here 
Bergmann is less convincing and seems to commit an error he spotted in 
his opponent. In this section, he is targeting someone who holds on to 
skeptical theism together with an extended version of commonsensism, 
which we might call “commonsensism+.” Commonsensism+ is just like 
commonsensism except that it adds to the inventory of commonsense data 
the belief, with respect to some actual evil E, that God wouldn’t permit E 
(or, more modestly, that it is unlikely that God would permit E). The idea 
is that she who accepts commonsensism+ “can just see directly, as a matter 
of common sense, that a perfectly loving God wouldn’t permit the evil 
in question” (17). I don’t suppose she claims that we all can just see this: 
she claims only that she and others like her can do so. (Thus, there really 
is no such view as commonsensism+, period; it, unlike commonsensism, 
must be relativized to a subject or subjects.) Now, it would seem that one 
could consistently hold the conjunction of commonsensism+ and skeptical 
theism; and so even a wildly successful defense of skeptical theism, one 
that convinced all rational human beings of the truth of skeptical theism, 
would leave open the possibility that some human beings could, without 
contradicting themselves, still believe of some actual evil E that there is 
no all-things-considered reason for a perfectly loving God to permit E (or 
that it is unlikely that there is), and believe that they know this. Such atheists 
would be taking a play from Bergmann’s own playbook in his defense of 
skeptical theism: their skepticism, they might note, merely rules out the 
possibility of their coming to know that there is no all-things-considered 
reason for permitting E (or that it is unlikely that there is) just by reflecting 
on the possible goods and possible evils we know of and on the known entailment 
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relations between them. But there is another way they can come to know 
this: they infer it from their commonsense+ knowledge that God wouldn’t 
(or is unlikely to) permit E.
Bergmann claims that such a combination of views is nevertheless 
unreasonable. Or, more precisely, he claims that the conjunction of those 
views and two other, quite plausible claims cannot reasonably be main-
tained. The other two claims are the following:
(1) For every instance of horrific suffering that we know to have occurred, 
there are possible states of affairs that are significantly worse than it or 
possible states of affairs that are outweighing greater goods. (18)
(2) For every instance of horrific suffering that we know to have occurred, 
although it is an intrinsically bad state of affairs, it is not intrinsically 
wrong to permit it, regardless of the consequences. (18)
Let us assume, with Bergmann, that these are quite plausible. So plausible, 
in fact, that one cannot reasonably fail to accept them upon consideration. 
What follows from this? Take Reasonable Ronny, who considers (1) and 
(2) and the skeptical component of skeptical theism, and accepts them all. 
Bergmann argues that in virtue of his accepting (2), he can reasonably be-
lieve, with respect to some actual evil E, that God wouldn’t (or is unlikely 
to) permit E only if he can reasonably believe this:
(3) It’s false or unlikely that there is some possible worse evil that could 
be avoided by God (or some possible outweighing good that could be  
obtained by God) only if E or something as bad were permitted. (19)
After all, Reasonable Ronny has accepted (2), and so he can’t consistently 
think that God wouldn’t permit E because it’s intrinsically wrong to per-
mit E. Bergmann then poses a challenge: how, he asks, does Reasonable 
Ronny arrive at (3)? Since he accepts (1), he can’t consistently think that 
there just is no possible state of affairs that is significantly worse than it. 
And in virtue of his acceptance of the skeptical component of skeptical 
theism, he can’t arrive at (3) by reflecting on the possible goods and pos-
sible evils we know of, and on the known entailment relations between 
them. Finally, it doesn’t seem like the sort of thing that one can just see 
directly: it’s a fairly complex claim, after all. Bergmann’s challenge cannot 
be met. So Reasonable Ronny can’t reasonably believe (3) after all, and 
hence he can’t reasonably believe, and a fortiori can’t know as a matter 
of commonsense, with respect to some actual evil E, that God wouldn’t 
permit E (or that it is unlikely that He would). That is, commonsensism+ 
(with respect to Ronny) is false. But if Reasonable Ronny is really reason-
able, he’ll see this line of argument, and so won’t accept commonsensism+.
If I am not mistaken, this argument simply misses the mark. The 
answer to the question of how Reasonable Ronny arrives at (3) is just this: 
Reasonable Ronny starts from commonsensism+, and infers (3) from the 
commonsense+ fact that God wouldn’t (or is unlikely to) permit E and 
the fact that it is not intrinsically wrong to permit E regardless of its 
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consequences. That inference is valid if Bergmann’s challenge has any 
force in the first place. To point out that you can know (or reasonably be-
lieve) a putative piece of common sense only if you can know (or reason-
ably believe) something else, which else you cannot see to be true directly 
or by reflecting on the possible goods and possible evils we know of and 
on the known entailment relations between them, does nothing to impugn 
the status of the putative piece of common sense as a genuine piece of 
common sense: you can come to know that something else by inferring 
it from common sense. Indeed, this is the essence of one of Bergmann’s 
replies to the critics of skeptical theism.
Perhaps I have misconstrued Bergmann’s remarks, and his point is 
simply that it is unreasonable to hold commonsensism+ in the first place, 
that you can’t reasonably believe that you (or some other human being) 
immediately and non-inferentially know(s), with respect to some evil E, 
that God wouldn’t (or is unlikely to) permit E. But is it unreasonable? I 
take it that is unreasonable only if it is unreasonable to believe that it is 
possible for a human being to have a properly basic belief, with respect 
to some evil E, that God wouldn’t (or is unlikely to) permit E. And is that 
unreasonable?
Well, before we ask if it’s reasonable, let us first ask, is it true? Bergmann 
(n16) cites Plantinga’s discussion, at the end of his Warranted Christian Belief, 
of a view very much like the relevant component of commonsensism+, the 
view that “one who is properly sensitive and properly aware of the sheer 
horror of the evil displayed in our somber and unhappy world will sim-
ply see that no being of the sort God is alleged to be could possibly permit 
it” (484). And Bergmann summarizes Plantinga’s conclusion as saying 
“it is false that the proper response to an awareness of the sheer horror 
of evil is to believe that God could not (or would not) permit it” (17). 
While this correctly captures Plantinga’s conclusion, it is nonetheless a 
bit misleading. Plantinga first argues for the following conditional claim: 
if Christian theism is true, then a fully rational person—one all of whose 
cognitive faculties are functioning properly—would not, indeed could 
not, have a basic belief, with respect to some evil E, that God wouldn’t 
permit E. Since Plantinga accepts the antecedent, he naturally accepts the 
consequent. But Plantinga implicitly acknowledges (492) that if, say, clas-
sical theism is false, then it might well be the case that it is possible for a 
human being to have a properly basic belief, with respect to some evil E, 
that God wouldn’t permit E. If there is in fact no God, and hence we are 
not designed to come to know God, is it not plausible that the proper im-
mediate response to the sheer horror of evil is the belief that God would 
not permit it (or, at the very least, that it’s unlikely that He would)? Here 
we have yet another instance of Plantinga’s central and ingenious move 
in WCB: the epistemology of religion cannot be neatly separated from 
the metaphysics of religion. And that seems right (to render a snap judg-
ment on Plantinga’s philosophy). But then if we return to the question 
whether it is unreasonable for, say, Reasonable Ronny to believe that it is 
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possible for a human being—perhaps himself—to have a properly basic 
belief, with respect to some evil E, that God wouldn’t (or is unlikely to) 
permit E, it seems that the question turns on what else Reasonable Ronny 
believes. (Here I assume that reasonableness is some species of internal 
rationality.) If Reasonable Ronny is a theist, like Bergmann, then it would 
perhaps be unreasonable for him to believe such a thing. But if he’s an 
atheist, then it seems he could well be reasonable in thinking it possible to 
have a properly basic belief, and non-inferential knowledge, with respect 
to some evil E, that God wouldn’t (or is unlikely to) permit E. Indeed, it 
seems he could reasonably believe that he has such non-inferential knowl-
edge. Of course, it would be dialectically inappropriate or at any rate use-
less to take as an undefended premise the claim, with respect to some evil 
E, that God wouldn’t (or is unlikely to) permit E, in an argument intended 
to convince a theist of the truth of atheism, but wasn’t that obvious to 
begin with?
The aim of Trenton Merricks’s essay, “Singular Propositions,” is to 
show that the received view about the metaphysics of propositions, that 
if a proposition is directly about some object, then it has that object as 
a constituent, is false. David Vander Laan, in his comments, captures 
the essay well when he says that Merricks “has launched a barrage of 
arguments—each of them transparently valid” (81). But each of the argu-
ments rests on controversial metaphysical premises, and often more than 
one: an evaluation of all the arguments would require a discussion of, 
among other things, the merits of eternalism, serious actualism, William-
son’s necessitism, and certain mereological principles. At this late hour, I 
cannot indulge myself. I will only say that the logical relations between 
the received view and these other claims are well-trodden territory (in 
part due to the work of Plantinga), so I do not know how many phi-
losophers who don’t already endorse Merricks’s conclusion will accept 
his premises.
Eleonore Stump’s essay, “The Nature of the Atonement,” begins with 
Plantinga’s claim that the atonement in which Christians believe is of such 
great value that it can single-handedly explain the presence of evil in our 
world. Stump agrees with Plantinga that there is such a thing as the atone-
ment and that it is of paramount value, but she raises difficulties for the 
standard accounts of what the atonement is. After arguing that the atone-
ment is meant to be a solution to three problems—the disposition to sin, 
guilt from past sins, and shame from past sins—Stump surveys three ac-
counts of just how the atonement is supposed to solve these problems, the 
two main contenders being the Anselmian and Thomistic theories. How-
ever, she raises unresolved questions about each of the main contenders, 
and she, together with her commentator, E. J. Coffman, gesture at new 
directions to pursue. The essay is both an excellent overview of the philo-
sophical issues surrounding this core element of Christian theism and a 
model of intellectual honesty and humility in philosophical theology: she 
forthrightly acknowledges that she has more questions than answers.
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Peter van Inwagen’s essay, “Causation and the Mental,” offers a strik-
ing solution to Jaegwon Kim’s puzzle for non-reductive materialists about 
mental events/states and mental causation: the solution, reminiscent of 
van Inwagen’s solution in Material Beings to certain puzzles surround-
ing constitution/composition, is that there are no such things as events or 
causation, and a fortiori no such things as mental events or mental causa-
tion, and hence nothing that can raise any puzzle. (More precisely, the 
claim is that causation, and a fortiori, mental causation, is never instanti-
ated.) This is no ad hoc reply, but rather a consequence of van Inwagen’s 
very general ontological claim that everything is either a substance or a 
relation; thus, there are no events and no causation, since the latter is a 
relation that holds between events if it holds at all. (Van Inwagen does 
not deny that there are true causal explanations, but the truth of these, 
he argues, does not require that there are any events.) Van Inwagen has 
demonstrated one advantage of denying the existence of events, namely 
that doing so allows one to avoid a certain puzzle one might otherwise 
have to confront. I suppose that could be taken as a reason to deny the 
existence of events. Even if it is such a reason, it has to be weighed against 
all the difficulties involved in such a denial. In any case, van Inwagen’s 
ambitions are more modest: he is merely noting that Kim’s puzzle pre-
supposes an ontology that one need not endorse, and that van Inwagen 
rejects on independent grounds.
The volume is rounded out by two other pieces: an excellent editorial 
introduction and a moving and informative appreciation of Plantinga’s 
philosophical contributions, delivered by his long-time friend and col-
league, Nicholas Wolterstorff. The former provides an overarching 
framework for the volume, and the latter drives home the significance of 
Plantinga’s achievements, especially for those of us who weren’t around 
in the “balmy days of positivism.” All in all, this high-caliber volume is a 
fitting tribute to one of our greatest philosophers.
Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, by William Hasker. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013. 269 pages. $99.00 (cloth)
DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington University
William Hasker writes: “The ‘three-in-oneness’ problem of the Trinity is 
really hard” (162). I couldn’t agree more. Appropriately for a treatise on 
that problem, Hasker divides his attempt at a solution into three parts: 
Trinitarian Foundations, Trinitarian Options, and Trinitarian Construction. 
Throughout, Hasker pushes something he calls “Social Trinitarianism.” 
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